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Abstract  A defining feature of retributive conceptions of karma is their regarding of 
suffering or misfortune as consequent upon sins committed in previous lives. Some critical 
non-believers in karma take offence at this view, considering it to involve unjustly blaming 
the victim. Defenders of the view demur, and argue that a belief in retributive karma in fact 
provides a motivation for benevolent action. This article elucidates the debate, showing that 
its depth is such that it is best characterized as a disagreement in form of life (in 
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VVHQVHUDWKHUWKDQDVDGLVDJUHHPHQWLQRSLQLRQV$OVREULHIO\GLVFXVVHGLVDQ
example of a non-retributive form that belief in karma and reincarnation can take. 
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In the case of some debates over religious and ethical matters, even if an imminent resolution 
looks unlikely, the possibility of a resolution is at least in view. In other cases, however, the 
disagreement runs so deep that a resolution is hard to conceive. An instance of these difficult 
cases is the dispute concerning the ethical propriety of believing in retributive karma. Karma, 
as many readers will know, is the Sanskrit term for ³action´ and a belief in retributive karma 
is the belief that at least some of the hardships, misfortunes or disadvantages that we suffer 
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are consequences of sinful actions that we ourselves performed at some earlier time, often in 
a previous life.1 Sometimes tKHEHOLHILVDUWLFXODWHGLQEDOGDQGSURYRFDWLYHWHUPV³Evil is 
man-made,´ writes Christmas Humphreys, ³and is of his choosing, and he who suffers suffers 
from his deliberate use of his own free will. Cripples, dwarfs and those born deaf or blind are 
the products of their own past actions´S Another defender of this belief, Joseph 
Prabhu, says of our misfortunes that they 
 
may serve as a reminder of some wrongdoing or weakness that we may well have 
forgotten, or may have been too insensitive even to recognise. Or, if that is not the 
case, as for example, in children or infants stricken with illnesses or handicaps, the 
belief is that this is the consequence of some crime committed in a previous life. 
(1989, p. 73) 
 
From time to time, the debate erupts into the public sphere and is picked up by the 
popular media. This occurred in 1999 when the then England football manager Glenn 
Hoddle allegedly endorsed the view that some people are born with physical or 
LQWHOOHFWXDOLPSDLUPHQWV³IRUDUHDVRQ´²the UHDVRQEHLQJWKDWWKHLU³NDUPDLVZRUNLQJ
from another lifetime´TXRWHGLQ'LFNLQVRQ &DOOVIRU+RGGOH¶VUHVLJQDWLRQUDSLGO\
ensued, and he resigned less than a week later (see BBC News 1999d). 
Remarks such as those of Humphreys, Prabhu and Hoddle are apt to stir up trouble. 
Often the reaction is one of hostility and disgust. Commenting on the statement from 
Humphreys in particular, Paul Edwards characterizes the sentiment expressed in it as 
³XQEHDUDEO\FUXHO´DQGZRQGHUVZKHWKHU³+XPSKUH\VUHDOO\ practiced what he 
preached´S From the sort of non-religious, or anti-religious, standpoint 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, McClelland (2010, p. 148) and Krishan (1997, pp. xi, 3±4, 44±46, 70±71, 195±196). 
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represented by Edwards, the holding of certain people responsible for their own 
misfortunes, in the way that the doctrine of karma proposes, is seen not merely as 
mistaken, but as morally reprehensible. The nub of the problem is that, ³We do not make 
the world better but we make it worse by blaming the victims´(GZDUGVS 
Often implicit, and sometimes explicit, in criticisms of the belief in karma is the view 
WKDWZHVWHUQVRFLHW\RXJKWWRKDYHRXWJURZQVXFK³PHGLHYDO´RU³SUH-PRGHUQ´LGHDV
7KHVHFULWLFLVPVWDFLWO\DFFHSWDFRQFHSWLRQRI³WKH:HVW´DVKDYLQJSURJUHVVHGPRUDOO\
and perhaps religiously, beyond the level of societies where beliefs in karma and 
UHLQFDUQDWLRQUHPDLQSUHYDOHQW7KHSODFHWKDWWKHVHEHOLHIVKDYHLQPDQ\SHRSOH¶VOLYHV²
how they are integrated into a broader religious and cultural worldview²tends not to be 
considered. Meanwhile, those who seek to defend the doctrine of karma often fail to see 
one of the deepest reasons why it can appear so morally unsettling. They assume that, 
provided one does not actively strive to worsen the practical situation of disadvantaged 
people, one does not do them any harm by attributing their situation to deeds done in 
previous lives. This assumption overlooks the possibility that holding someone 
responsible for her own misfortune may itself constitute an injury, and hence blankly 
misses a central point of the contention that blaming the victim makes matters worse. 
This article will consider further the sort of disagreement that has just been outlined, 
exploring its moral, religious and conceptual dimensions. It will highlight the extent to 
which this disagreement exemplifies the kind of debate whose depth immunizes it against 
HDV\UHVROXWLRQ7DNLQJWKHURZVXUURXQGLQJ+RGGOH¶VQRZQRWRULRXVUHPDUNVDVD
starting point, the discussion will focus on a defence of the belief in retributive karma that 
has been offered by Arvind Sharma. I shall aUJXHWKDW6KDUPD¶VGHIHQFHRYHUORRNVDQ
important matter: by trying to separate the mere regarding of someone as responsible for 
her own misfortune on the one hand, from behaving unkindly to that person on the other, 
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6KDUPD¶VSRVLWLRQIDLOVHYHQWRQRWLFHthat merely regarding someone as responsible for 
her own misfortune may itself be perceived as an injustice. By discussing and elaborating 
an analogy that Sharma draws to illustrate the distinction he is making, I aim to bring out 
significant particularities of the belief in retributive karma, especially its differences from 
certain kinds of empirically grounded belief. In the light of these differences a firmer grip 
on the nature and depth of the debate can be achieved. Rather than trying to resolve the 
debate, my discussion will clarify why its resolution is so difficult. A secondary aim is to 
indicate the variety of forms that beliefs in karma and reincarnation can take, and to this 
end a non-retributive construal of rebirth will briefly be considered.   
 
³A compelling rationale for respect´? 
)ROORZLQJ*OHQQ+RGGOH¶VDOOHJHGassertion that disabled people are reaping the 
consequences of karma from a former lifetime, the BBC reported that ³Disabled groups 
have described his remarks as deeply offensive,´ with Anne Rae, the Chair of the British 
Council of Disabled People, calling them ³an insult to disabled people´TXRWHGLQ%%&
News 1999b).2 The Times newspaper quoted a spokeswoman for the Disabled [Football] 
6XSSRUWHUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQdemanding +RGGOH¶VUHVLJQation and declaring it to be 
³disgusting for a man in his position to be talking like this´TXRWHGLQ'LFNLQVRQDQG
Farrell 1999). In his own defence, Hoddle claimed that his remarks had been 
³misconstrued, misunderstood and misinterpreted´, and he emphasized the fact that he 
has done ³a lot of work ... to raise money for disabled charities´TXRWHGLQ%%&1HZV
1999a). 
:KLOH+RGGOH¶VRZQVSLULWXDOEHOLHIVRZHPore to ³New Age´ reconstructions of 
traditional understandings of reincarnation than to the traditional understandings 
                                                          
2
 See also BBC News (1999c). 
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themselves, LWZDVQHYHUWKHOHVVUHPDUNDEOHWKDWPDQ\RI+RGGOH¶VFULWLFVseemed 
oblivious to the prevalence among certain religious groups, including various Hindu and 
Buddhist communities, of the kind of view attributed to Hoddle. Responding to such 
apparent oversights, Arvind Sharma, writing in Hinduism Today, noted that ³Glenn 
+RGGOH¶VFRPPHQWVRQNDUPDUHLQFDUQDWLRQDQGGLVDELOLW\VKRXOGKDYHDWWUDFWHGOLWWOH
attention. The belief that disability is the result of past life karma is held by Hindus, 
Buddhists and other religionists´ ,Q6KDUPD¶VRSLQLRQ³Hinduism offers a very 
rational explanation for disability and a compelling rationale for respect and proper 
treatment of the disabled´ He argues that the belief that disability is a result of 
immoral acts committed in a previous life need not lead to disrespectful treatment of 
disabled people. This is because the proper TXHVWLRQIRUWKH+LQGXWRDVN³LVQRWµWhy 
him or her?¶,WLVµGiven the situation, what is my duty?¶´ (1999). 
,QRUGHUWRFRQWH[WXDOL]H6KDUPD¶VDUJXPHQWLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRVHHLWDVUHVSRQGLQJWR
commentators such as Anne Rae, whom Sharma quotes as offering the following 
statement: 
 
+RGGOH¶VYLHZVKDYHDQJHUHGDQGIUXVWUDWHGWKRVH'LVDEOHG3HRSle who understand 
that these medieval beliefs underlie much of the (unspoken) justification for prejudice 
and discrimination against us. Good life, good reincarnation; bad life, bad 
reincarnation. Not dissimilar to the view held by some Christians that ³the sins of the 
father are visited upon the children´ (Quoted in Sharma 1999) 
 
This characterization of beliefs in karma and reincarnation as ³medieval´ itself discloses 
an interesting prejudice concerning the relation between secular western values and those 
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of cultures wherein such allegedly outdated notions remain pervasive.3 From this 
prejudicial standpoint, the belief in karma is consigned to the category of primitive 
religious dogmas that we should have left behind centuries ago. 
Another notable feature of the comment attributed to Rae is its implicit consequentialism. 
One might have expected a spokesperson for organizations of disabled people to emphasize 
the intrinsic offensiveness of insinuating a direct connection EHWZHHQDSHUVRQ¶VSK\VLFDORU
intellectual impairment and some undetectable transgression for which the person is assumed 
to be responsible. The connection between immorality and impairment is one that has a long 
history among traditions in which the doctrine of karma and reincarnation is prominent. For 
example, the 0ƗQDYD 'KDUPDĞƗVWUD (c. 200 CE), a lawbook of Brahmanical Hinduism, states 
that 
 
Some evil men become disfigured because of bad deeds committed in this world, and 
some because of deeds done in a previous life. ... In this way, as a result of the 
remnants of their past deeds ... are born individuals despised by good people: the 
mentally retarded, the mute, the blind, and the deaf, as well as those who are 
deformed. (Ch. 11, vv. 48±53, trans. Olivelle 2005, p. 217) 
 
And a relativel\HDUO\0DKƗ\ƗQD%XGGKLVWVFULSWXUHSUHVHQWVWKH%XGGKDDVSURFODLPLQJ
that resisting his teachings or obstructing those who wish to follow them is liable to result 
LQRQH¶VEHLQJ³ERUQDJDLQDQGDJDLQERUQHLWKHUEOLQGGXOO-witted, dumb, or as an 
outcaste, always living in misery, always a victim of abuse´TXRWHGLQ:LOOVRQS
                                                          
3
 Cf. Tom Shakespeare (2007, p. 421): ³Society may have progressed beyond pre-modern ideas about disability 
being punishment for former sins, or karma, but it generally regards disabled people as defined by their deficits 
... .´ 
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15).4 Passages such as these vividly exemplify the kinds of belief to which Rae is 
opposed, and yet, rather than focusing on the intrinsic offensiveness of such beliefs, Rae 
seeks to highlight theLUUROHLQMXVWLI\LQJ³prejudice and discrimination´DJDLQVWdisabled 
people. 
This apparent emphasis on the consequences, or likely consequences, of the beliefs in 
question allows Sharma to respond in a way that aims to decouple the beliefs from the 
SXUSRUWHGEHKDYLRXUDOFRQVHTXHQFHV+HDUJXHVQRWPHUHO\WKDWEHOLHYLQJVRPHRQH¶VGLVDEity 
to be a result of past sins need not give rise to maltreatment of disabled people, but that, on 
the contrary, such a belief is liable to encourage positive action towards them. The 
³FRPSHOOLQJUDWLRQDOHIRUUHVSHFWDQGSURSHUWUHDWPHQWRIWKHGLVDEOHG´WRZKLFK6KDUPD
refers consists in the idea that, in the light of the doctrine of karma and reincarnation, one can 
expect any disrespectful or improper WUHDWPHQWRIGLVDEOHGSHRSOHRQRQH¶VRZQSDUWWR
eventuate in deleterious consequences for oneself in a future life.5 Indeed, although Sharma 
does not put the point quite so explicitly himself, he might plausibly be taken to be implying 
that if one behaves uncharitably in this life, one will be reborn disabled oneself in the next. 
6KDUPDZULWHV³,WLVQRWIRUXVWRVD\µ,WLVWKHUHVXOWRI\RXUNDUPD¶,WLVIRUXVWRDVN
µ*LYHQKLVRUKHUFRQGLWLRQZKDWLVP\GXW\P\GKDUPD"¶2WKHUZLVHLI\RXEODPH the 
victim, you will be blamed, rather than helped, wKHQ\RXKDSSHQWREHWKHYLFWLP´ 
The reasoning here is prudential, the underlying assumption being that what motivates the 
believer in karma to behave well towards disabled or other disadvantaged people is the threat 
of not being treated well oneself in the future²the threat, that is, of being retributively 
afflicted, neglected or abused as a consequence of the rebalancing effect of the impersonal 
karmic law. There is, apparently, no recognition RQ6KDUPD¶VSDUWWKDWWKHUHPLJKWEH
                                                          
4
 The translation is by %KLNNKX3ƗVƗGLND, and the passage is from the 3UDYUDM\ƗQWDUƗ\D6ǌWUD, which is quoted 
both in the 6ǌWUD6DPXFFD\D (commonly, though contentiously, attributed to 1ƗJƗUMXQD, c. 2nd±3rd century CE) 
DQGLQĝƗQWLGHYD¶VĝLNVKƗ6DPXFFD\D (8th century CE).  
5
 Some popular writers, following Edgar Cayce, have designaWHGWKLVWKH³karmic boomerang effect´RU
³boomerang karma´6ee, for example, McClelland (2010, p. 150) and Hardo (2007, p. 249). 
8 
 
anything morally objectionable about blaming the victim per se, regardless of any 
repercussions that doing so may have for the one who does the blaming; in other words, no 
recognition that holding the victim responsible for her own misfortune might in itself be a bad 
thing. 
One possible source of the difficulty may be an unduly restricted conception of what 
³EODPLQJWKHYLFWLP´FRQVLVWVLQ$VZHZLOOVHHLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ6KDUPDVRPHWLPHVJLYHV
the impression that, if blaming the victim is wrong at all, it is wrong because it involves, 
firstly, overtly telling the person in question that she is to blame for her predicament, and 
secondly, refusing to assist that person even if she is in need of help. While these responses to 
VRPHRQH¶VPLVIRUWXQHPD\LQGHHGEHSDWHQWO\KDUPIXODQGVRXUFHVRIRIIHQFHLWZRXOGEH
misleading to suppose them to be the only possible sources. From the perspective of a non-
believer in karma, an entirely intelligible reaction to the sort of link between sin and 
disadvantage that this doctrine makes would be to regard the making of this very link as 
intrinsically offensive, irrespective of whether the believer verbally asserts the link in the 
presence of the disadvantaged person or refuses to offer any practical assistance. Admittedly, 
Rae muddies the waters by implying that it is the capacity of the belief in karma to support 
prejudice and negative discrimination that is the problem. What I am suggesting is that the 
problem can be conceived in a different way, as consisting not in the capacity of the belief to 
VXSSRUWRU³XQGHUOLH´SUHMXGLFHDQGKDUPIXOEHKDYLRXUEXWLQWKHIDFWWKDWWKHEHOLHILWVHOI
constitutes a harmful prejudice, a prejudice that derogates and insults the disadvantaged 
person whether or not it is overtly expressed in words or actions. It is this conception of the 
SUREOHPWKDW6KDUPD¶VUHVSRQVHIDLOVWRDGGUHVVDQGZKLFK6KDUPDGRHVQRWUHFRJQL]HDV
constituting a problem at all. 
From the viewpoint of someone who raises the sort of objection I have just outlined, any 
attempt to defend comments such as those attributed to Hoddle on the grounds that the person 
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making them has done a considerable amount of charity work in aid of disabled people will 
appear beside the point. Indeed, even if the person in question has gone beyond mere charity 
fundraising and has actively campaigned for the sorts of far-reaching socio-political changes 
that many disability rights activists advocate, this would not diminish the problem.6 For the 
problem at issue is not that people such as Hoddle fail to act in ways intended to improve the 
social and economic status of disabled or other disadvantaged people. The problem is that 
they hold a belief that involves perceiving such people in a particular way²as being 
responsible for their own disadvantage. 
That Sharma does not see the problem in these terms is brought out by his observation 
WKDWZKHQHQFRXQWHULQJVRPHRQHZKRLVLQQHHGRIDVVLVWDQFHDEHOLHILQNDUPD³FRPPHQGV
warm-hearted concern to minimizHWKHSHUVRQ¶VSUREOHPVHYHQWKRXJKFDXVHGE\KLVRUKHU
own actions in the past´ :KDWLVRYHUORRNHGKHUHLVWKDWWKH³HYHQWKRXJK´-clause is, 
from the sort of ethical perspective I have been highlighting, radically undermining of any 
merit that tKH³ZDUP-KHDUWHGFRQFHUQ´PD\RWKHUZLVHKDYHSRVVHVVHG7RUHJDUGRQH¶VDFWLRQ
as one of assisting someone even though that person is responsible for her own need of 
assistance is to place it in a very different light from that of assisting the person simply 
because she is in need. It is to look at the person in a wholly different way, and hence to stand 
in a radically different relation to her²a UHODWLRQWKDWIDUIURPRIIHULQJ³DFRPSHOOLQJ
UDWLRQDOHIRUUHVSHFW´FRXOGEHFRQVWUXHGDVLQWULQVLFDOO\disrespectful. 
To assist someone even though she is responsible for her own need of assistance is, 
incontrovertibly, to give assistance. But it is, at the same time, to maintain that there are 
grounds for not JLYLQJDVVLVWDQFH7KDW¶VZKDWLVZLGHO\UHJDUGHGDV so offensive, for 
H[DPSOHDERXWWKHYLHZWKDWFHUWDLQYLFWLPVRIVH[XDODVVDXOWZHUH³DVNLQJIRULW´EHFDXVH
they went out late at night wearing skimpy clothing. To refrain from assisting such a victim 
                                                          
6
 For discussion of disability rights issues, see, for example, Barnes (1994) and Shakespeare (2006). 
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to bring her assailant to justice on the grounds that the victim was not respectably dressed at 
the time of the attack, or had been working as a prostitute, or has a reputation for being 
flirtatious, etc., would be to blame her very explicitly for the crime that has been committed 
against her. But even if one were to assist the victim, doing so with the thought that one is 
helping her even though, or despite the fact that, she is at least partially responsible for 
inviting the assault would have a very different moral character from simply recognizing that 
the woman needs assistance and that her mode of attire, occupation as a sex worker, past 
VH[XDOKLVWRU\HWFFRQVWLWXWHQRJURXQGVZKDWVRHYHUIRUPLWLJDWLRQRQWKHDVVDLODQW¶VSDUW7 
 
Facts and values 
)URPDSHUVSHFWLYHVXFKDV6KDUPD¶VWKHVHSRLQWVPD\be deemed to give insufficient weight 
to the distinction that Sharma is making between what, for a believer in karma, is the fact that 
someone is responsible for her own situation on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 
evaluative decision concerning how we ought to treat that person here and now. It might be 
said that the case of someone who is sexually assaulted, and who happens to have been 
wearing revealing clothing at the time, is quite different; it is different because wearing 
revealing clothing does not make one responsible for being assaulted, whereas according to 
the doctrine of karma, committing a sin in one life does make the perpetrator responsible for 
certain hardships suffered in a subsequent life. I would concede that the cases diverge in 
various respects, and would reiterate that the sexual assault example was adduced primarily 
to illustrate the specific point that assisting someone even though one considers her to have 
brought on the trouble herself has a very different moral character from assisting her merely 
because she is in need. 
                                                          
7
 For a far more sophisticated discussion of these themes than I can provide here, see Nussbaum (1999, pp. 136±
46). For relevant recent campaigning literature, see the materials produced by SlutWalk Toronto (2012) and 
³Slut Means Speak Up!´ 
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,QDPRUHUHFHQWDUWLFOHRI6KDUPD¶VWKDQWKHRQH,KDYHVRIDUEHHQGLVFXVVLQJKH
articulates his position with reference to an analogy of his own²an analogy with the medical 
scientific view that many cases of lung cancer are, in large part, caused by chronic smoking. 
³)URPWKHVWDQGSRLQWRIPHGLFDOVFLHQFH´KHZULWHV 
 
it is a question of fact and not value. Chronic smoking causes cancer, so the statement that 
a patient is now suffering from lung cancer as a result of being a chronic smoker is a 
statement of fact, which does not make medical science a callous science. If, however, the 
GRFWRUZHUHWRVD\WRWKHSDWLHQWDIWHUVKHKDVEHHQGLDJQRVHG³<RXEURXJKWWKLVFDQFHU
on yourself by chronic smoking. You are to blame for it. Therefore I am not going to treat 
you´²then the doctor would be exhibiting a callous streak and would have let down his 
profession. The doctor has converted the fact into a negative value by blaming the victim. 
Normally, however, doctors convert it into a positive value²in the sense that while 
holding the victim responsible for her condition, they do what they can to treat it and are 
solicitous rather than callous in their approach to the patient. (2008, pp. 572±573) 
 
One interesting feature of this analogy is the statement that Sharma attributes to the imagined 
GRFWRUZKRZRXOGWKHUHE\³EHH[KLELWLQJDFDOORXVVWUHDN´)URPWKHZD\LQZKLFK6KDUPD
SUHVHQWVLWLWLVQ¶WFOHDUH[DFWO\ZKDWWKHFDOORXVQHVVFRQVLVWVLQ8QGRXEWHGO\UHIXsing to 
give medical treatment to the patient would be callous. But what if the part of the statement 
that Sharma places in italics were omitted, leaving only the assertion that the patient is to 
blame for her own illness: would that, on its own, display callousness? Perhaps it depends on 
how the doctor goes about expressing this to the patient. There are, we may presume, ways of 
tactfully conveying the information to the patient that her smoking has contributed to her life-
threatening condition without doing so in a bluntly accusatory manner. To say to the woman 
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that she is to blame for her illness would carry a moralising tone that is inappropriate in most 
clinical contexts, but to refrain from explaining the most likely causes of her illness would, 
equally, be neglectful of the sort of responsibility that the doctor has to his patient. So the 
GRFWRU¶VGXW\FRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDVEHLQJWRH[SODLQDVEHVWKHFDQWKHIDFWVRIWKHPDWWHU
without thereby passing any moral judgement upon the patient. In the light of the facts, the 
patient may react by blaming herself for her illness, but this will not be as a result of her 
having been blamed in terms of moral disapproval by the doctor. 
2QWKLVUHDGLQJRI6KDUPD¶VLOOXVWUDWLYHDQDORJ\LWLVWKHZKROHRIWKHVWDWement attributed 
to the doctor that is inappropriate, and not just the final, italicized, portion. And what makes it 
especially inappropriate is the nature of the relation in which the doctor stands to the patient. 
,WLVQRWWKHGRFWRU¶VSODFHWRPRUDOO\Friticize his patients within the clinical setting even if, 
in the privacy of his own thoughts, he may feel that the patient has behaved irresponsibly. 
There are, no doubt, many interesting issues that cases of this sort raise. The central one for 
our current purposes, however, is how, or whether, any illuminating comparison can be made 
with the belief in karma. 
As with most analogies, there are both important similarities and important differences 
that need to be taken into account. The most salient difference is that, while the belief that 
FKURQLFVPRNLQJVLJQLILFDQWO\UDLVHVRQH¶VFKDQFHVRIGHYHORSLQJOXQJFDQFHULVEDVHGRQD
substantial body of empirical evidence, the belief in retributive karma is not based on 
empirical evidence at all. Although there are some researchers who do not rule out the 
possibility of finding empirical evidence to support it,8 it remains the case that the belief in 
retributive karma does not owe its existence to any such evidence; it has arisen, and persisted, 
                                                          
8
 See, for example, Stevenson (1977, p. 323), where Stevenson tantalizingly notes that ³There is ... almost no 
evidence ... that offers any empirical basis for the concept of retributive karma´ (my emphasis). Stevenson 
elsewhere remarks that he has studied four cases ³in which a birth defect has been said to derive from some 
wrongdoing on the part of the previous personality [i.e., the alleged previous incarnation of the person with the 
defect]´ (Stevenson 1997, p. 1372). In general, however, the sorts of cases investigated by Stevenson and his 
colleagues tend to be inconsistent with what traditional beliefs in retributive karma would lead one to expect; 
see, for example, Tucker (2009, pp. 73±74). 
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in human communities independently of anything that would be recognized as data 
comparable to that which supports the connection between smoking and lung cancer. Some 
critics of the belief in karma would infer from this that it is irrational to hold the belief and 
that would-be believers have an epistemic obligation to seek out reliable evidence before the 
belief can be considered rational. This, however, would be to make the mistake of treating the 
belief as falling within the same logical category as beliefs that are founded on empirical 
evidence. The point about beliefs in reincarnation and retributive karma is not that there is 
little empirical support for them, but rather that they are not well characterized as empirical 
beliefs in the first place. 
To deny that beliefs in retributive karma are empirical beliefs is not to deny that they play 
DQH[SODQDWRU\UROHLQPDQ\SHRSOH¶VOLYHV,WLVWRGHQ\WKDWNDUPLFH[SODQDWLRQVDUHW\SLFDOO\
treated by those who deploy them as being empirically demonstrable or falsifiable ± or, at any 
rate, as being empirically demonstrable or falsifiable in anything remotely like the way in 
ZKLFKDPHGLFDOVFLHQWLILFK\SRWKHVLVVXFKDV³FKURQLFVPRNLQJVXEVWDQWLDOO\LQFUHDVHVRQH¶V
FKDQFHVRIGHYHORSLQJOXQJFDQFHU´LVWUHDWHG 
The role that EHOLHIVLQNDUPDGRSOD\LQPDQ\SHRSOH¶VOLYHVLVZHOOEURXJKWRXWLQFHUWDLQ
ethnographic studies, where we see that, while believers are far from ignorant about 
processes of natural causation, they tend to invoke karmic explanations in response to 
questions that are not addressable in terms associated with natural causation. Thus, for 
example, in a study of Burmese forms of Buddhism, Melford Spiro notes that, 
QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHLUNQRZOHGJHWKDW³FURSIDLOXUHVDUHFDXVHGE\GURXJKWKHDWDQGRWKHU
QDWXUDOFDXVHV´%XUPHVHSHRSOHIUHTXHQWO\KDYHIXUWKHUTXHVWLRQVWRDVNTXHVWLRQVVXFKDV 
 
... why did the rains fail this year [in particular]? And why in the north, and not in the 
VRXWK"2UZK\GLGWKHR[HQGHVWUR\8<RXQ¶VVHHGEHGVEXWQRW8+WHLQ¶V" Or why did 
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WKHILUHEXUQ83DLQ¶VFURSEXWQRW8.\L¶V":K\HOVHLIQRWIRUGLIIHUHQFHVLQNDUPD" 
(1982, p. 136) 
 
To illustrate roughly the same point, Martin Willson (1987, p. 54) notes that, were someone 
to be killed by a falling branch while walking through the forest, a scientific explanation for 
WKHRFFXUUHQFHZRXOGOHDYHXVZLWKQRDFFRXQWRWKHUWKDQ³FRLQFLGHQFH´RIZK\WKLV
particular person happened to be walking beneath that particular branch at precisely the time 
when it fell. In some cultures, an explanation in terms of sorcery might be looked for, 
ZKHUHDVIURPD%XGGKLVWSHUVSHFWLYHDQH[SODQDWLRQZRXOGUHIHUWRWKHSHUVRQ¶VNDUPD.9 
Conceiving of the distinction that is being made here by speaking of, on the one hand, 
scientific explanations or explanations that appeal to natural causes, and on the other hand, 
explanations that appeal to karma, may be slightly misleading. It may be misleading because 
those who deploy explanations that appeal to karma often have an expanded conception of 
³QDWXUDOFDXVDWLRQ´RU³QDWXUDOODZ´ZKLFKHQFRPSDVVHVboth what Spiro has in mind when 
KHUHIHUVWR³QDWXUDOFDXVHV´and what he has in mind when he refers to explanations in terms 
RI³GLIIHUHQFHVLQNDUPD´6LQFHWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\LWKDVEHHQDFRPPRQpractice among 
H[SRVLWRUVRI6RXWK$VLDQUHOLJLRXVWKRXJKWWRXWLOL]HWKHYRFDEXODU\RI³QDWXUDOODZ´ZKHQ
giving an account of the doctrine of karma, and this practice was enthusiastically taken up by 
Indian authors writing in European languages.10 The practice has been especially prevalent in 
                                                          
9
 The similarities between the sorts of questions that are responded to in terms of sorcery or witchcraft on the 
one hand, and karma on the other, are striking in many respects. Note, for example, /D)RQWDLQH¶VUHPDUNWKDW
³witchcraft explains why misfortune happened to a particular person at a particular point in time, not how it 
happened´S and also the account of witchcraft beliefs among the Azande in Evans-Pritchard 
(1937, esp. p. 69). This, however, is not the place to pursue these similarities further. 
10
 Cf. Obeyesekere (2002, p. 131): ³... even though nineteenth-century scientific philosophy is outdated, 
Buddhist intellectuals, who rarely have moved out of that century, eveQQRZDGD\VUHIHUWRNDUPDDVDµnatural 
law¶ in order to designate its determinate and impersonal quality.´ 
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publications issued by or influenced by the Theosophical Society, and has become pervasive 
in popular expositions of Hindu and Buddhist beliefs.11 
Although we should be wary of assuming that these popularized formulations are fully 
representative of Hindu and Buddhist conceptions of karma, whether traditional or 
contemporary, there is little doubt that the running together of what, in western academic 
SDUODQFHPLJKWEHWHUPHGWKH³QDWXUDO´DQGWKH³QRUPDWLYH´RU³HWKLFDO´DVSHFWVRIKXPDQ
life is fairly common among believers in karma. One manifestation of the absence of a clear 
distinction of this kind is the fact that, in cultures wherein belief in karma is prevalent, it is 
common for illnesses and impairments to be conceived of as consequences of karma.12 The 
empirical explanation of how the disease, injury or congenital abnormality occurred is placed 
within a broader karmic account of why this individual, and not someone else, was affected 
by this particular condition. Thus, in the case of smoking and lung cancer, while it is likely to 
EHDFFHSWHGWKDWFKURQLFVPRNLQJGUDPDWLFDOO\LQFUHDVHVRQH¶VFKDQFHVRIGHYHORSLQJWKH
disease, it is also likely to be maintained that why only some and not all heavy smokers 
develop it, and why many but not all instances of it prove fatal, is a matter of karma. 
None of this negates my contention that there is an important difference between the 
PHGLFDOVFLHQWLILFEHOLHIWKDWVPRNLQJLQFUHDVHVRQH¶VFKDQFHVRIGHYHORSLQJOXQJFDQFHUDnd 
the karmic belief that suffering in this life results from sins performed in previous ones. It 
merely prompts us to be cautious in how we characterize that difference. Rather than saying 
that, in the former case, the belief concerns natural causation whereas in the latter it concerns 
karmic causation, we need to recognize that many believers in karma may be operating with a 
more expansive conception of the natural, according to which karmic causation is itself a 
IRUPRIQDWXUDOFDXVDWLRQJRYHUQHGE\³QDWXUDOODZ´:KDWWKHGLIIHUHQFHFRQVLVWVLQLVDV,
                                                          
11
 A classic Theosophical account is Besant (1917, esp. p. 11). See also Pavri and Jinarajadasa (1927, p. 108). 
An example of a popular exposition of Hinduism is What Is Hinduism? Modern Adventures into a Profound 
Global Faith (2007; see esp. p. 124). 
12
 See, for example, Dalal and Pande (1988) and Rukwong et al. (2007). 
16 
 
noted earlier, that the form of natural causation that constitutes the link between smoking and 
cancer is open to empirical confirmation or falsification, whereas the form that constitutes the 
link betweHQRQH¶VFXUUHQWH[LVWHQWLDOSUHGLFDPHQWDQGSDVW-life behaviour is not. 
:LWKWKHVHSRLQWVLQPLQGZHPLJKWHPEHOOLVK6KDUPD¶VDQDORJ\E\FRQVLGHULQJDFDVHLQ
which the doctor is a believer in retributive karma. If the patient and doctor both inhabit a 
culture where the doctrine of karma and reincarnation is generally accepted, they may simply 
WDNHLWIRUJUDQWHGWKDWDOWKRXJKWKHSDWLHQW¶VORQJ-term smoking habit has contributed to her 
developing lung cancer, the underlying reason why she has developed the disease (when not 
everyone who smokes develops it) is that she engaged in immoral behaviour in one or more 
previous lives. In this situation, the issue of whether karma has played a role may not arise. It 
is conceivable, however, that such a situation could provide an occasion for the belief in 
karma to be questioned. The patient may declare that the suffering she is now enduring is so 
extreme that she cannot imagine its being the consequence of any past action, however 
egregious. (This kind of response PD\EHPRUHHDVLO\FRQFHLYDEOHLQDFDVHZKHUHVRPHRQH¶V
child KDVEHHQGLDJQRVHGZLWKDWHUPLQDOLOOQHVV³+RZFRXOGDQ\WKLQJZDUUDQWWKHSDLQIXO
GHDWKRIVRPHRQHVR\RXQJ´WKHSDUHQWVPD\H[FODLP$OWHUQDWLYHO\WKHSDWLHQWPD\DFFHSW
the suffering stoically, acknowledging that, through enduring the torments of this life, she 
must surely be destined to enjoy a more favourable rebirth. 
But now suppose that the patient is not a believer in karma. She asks her doctor why she 
in particular has developed the disease when so many others have smoked no less heavily 
WKDQVKHKDV³:HOO´UHSOLHVWKHGRFWRU³WKHUHPD\EHYDULRXVRWKHUOLIHVW\OHDQGJHQHWLF
factors involved, but ultimately it is your karma²you must have done something bad in a 
SUHYLRXVOLIH´+ere we have a scenario quite unlike that in which the patient has been told 
that it is her smoking that is responsible for causing the illness. Now she is confronted with a 
belief that is not based on empirical evidence, but is partially constitutive of a worldview with 
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which she may feel little or no affinity. Moreover, it is a belief that involves holding her 
morally responsible for her own affliction. No longer is her crime merely that of neglecting 
her own health; the suggestion is now being made that she did something²something hidden 
beyond the reach of empirical discovery²that was so morally reprehensible as to warrant the 
suffering she is undergoing. In these circumstances, I want to suggest, one would be failing to 
appreciate the gravity of the charge that has been made against the patient if one were to 
DVVXPHWKDWWKHGRFWRU¶VNDUPLFGLDJQRVLVRIKHUFRQGLWLRQLVPHUHO\DFDVHRIKLVRIIHULQJ³D
statement of fact, which does not make [the doctrine of retributive karma] a callous 
>GRFWULQH@´)URPWKHSDWLHQW¶VSRLQWRIYLHZWKDWGRFWULQHPD\DSSHDUYHU\FDOORXVLQGHHG
regardless of whether the doctor verbally confronts her with it or refuses to give her the 
treatment she requires. Of course, these latter actions may compound the offence that is 
caXVHGEXWP\SRLQWKDVEHHQWREULQJRXWWKHLQWHOOLJLELOLW\RIVRPHRQH¶VUHJDUGLQJthe belief 
itself as offensive²as a source of moral perturbation. 
 
Thinking in a different way 
One of the things that I have been trying to expose in the above discussion is the depth of the 
disagreement between someone who believes that disadvantaged people are karmically 
responsible for their own misfortunes and someone who finds this belief morally offensive. 
Sharma implies that what is at issue is a factual matter: the believer in retributive karma holds 
it to be a fact that, for example, disabled people acted immorally in previous lives, whereas 
disbelievers deny that this is the case. On this view, the disbelievers have no reason to take 
offence, since the factual belief does not preclude benevolent modes of action towards 
disadvantaged people; it merely precludes their being regarded as innocent. But this way of 
seeing it risks underplaying the conceptual gap²the gap of understanding²that separates the 
two parties. A more appropriate way of characterizing the disagreement may be to adduce a 
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distinction that Wittgenstein makes in the Philosophical Investigations between agreement in 
RSLQLRQVDQGDJUHHPHQWLQIRUPRIOLIH³:KDWLVWUXHRUIDOVHLVZKDWKXPDQEHLQJVsay´he 
ZULWHV³DQGLWLVLQWKHLUlanguage that human beings agree. This is agreement not in 
opinions, but rather in form of life´ What I have been arguing is that, in the 
dispute over retributive karma, we encounter a disagreement not in opinions but in form of 
life: a disagreement that cannot be resolved by rational deliberation²or, at any rate, cannot 
be resolved by rational deliberation alone²but only by one or other party in the debate 
undergoing a change of perspective so transformative that it would amount to a change in 
form of life. This should, perhaps, not surprise us, for the doctrine of karma and reincarnation 
is part of a religious worldview; to come to believe in it, or to lose that belief, is a matter of 
conversion, not a matter of seeing the soundness of an argument or the implications of a new 
piece of evidence. 
%XWVLQFH³IRUPRIOLIH´LVQRWDWHFKQLFDOWHUPIRU:LWWJHQVWHLQDQGKDVQRVWULFW
definition,13 we might wonder whether anything has really been illuminated by invoking it. 
What may help is an example which, to my mind, illustrates the kind of thing that 
Wittgenstein is thinking of when he speaks of agreement, or disagreement, in form of life as 
RSSRVHGWRDJUHHPHQWRUGLVDJUHHPHQWLQRSLQLRQV,QRQHRIKLV³/HFWXUHVRn Religious 
%HOLHI´:LWWJHQVWHLQLVUHSRUWHGWRKDYHVDLGWKHIROORZLQJ 
 
6XSSRVHVRPHRQHLVLOODQGKHVD\V³7KLVLVDSXQLVKPHQW´DQG,VD\³,I,¶PLOO,GRQ¶W
WKLQNRISXQLVKPHQWDWDOO´,I\RXVD\³'R\RXEHOLHYHWKHRSSRVLWH"´²you can call it 
believing the opposite, but it is entirely different from what we would normally call 
believing the opposite. 
                                                          
13
 Cf. Ross (2009, p. 20): ³µform of life¶ should not be seen as a theoretical or technical term but should be 
looked at as simply descriptive of the way language operates: it is interwoven with our lives.´ 
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I think differently, in a different way. I say different things to myself. I have different 
pictures. 
,WLVWKLVZD\LIVRPHRQHVDLG³:LWWJHQVWHLQ\RXGRQ¶WWDNHLOOQHVVDVSXQLVKPHQWVR
ZKDWGR\RXEHOLHYH"´²,¶GVD\³,GRQ¶WKDYHDQ\WKRXJKWVRISXQLVKPHQW´ (1966, p. 
55)14 
 
In a case such as this it is entirely possible to imagine the two individuals concerned getting 
along fairly well together. The one who thinks of his illness as a punishment might even be a 
patient who is being treated by the other, who is his doctor. The fact that the patient thinks as 
KHGRHVQHHGQRWLQWHUIHUHZLWKWKHGRFWRU¶VDELOLW\WRWUHDWKLPEXWLWGRHVPHDQWKDWat a 
certain level, they do not understand one another. It is not just that they conceive of illness 
differently: it is that their different ways of conceiving of illness are liable to be ramifications 
of their conceptions of life more broadly. The patient sees the experiences of his life as 
KDYLQJDGLPHQVLRQRIVLJQLILFDQFHWKDWLVDEVHQWIURPWKHGRFWRU¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIOLIH7KH
patient sees moral and spiritual meaning in occurrences that the doctor sees in purely non-
moral and non-spiritual terms.15 This is why the difference between them runs too deep to be 
well described as a difference of opinion. 
The doctor and one of her colleagues might have a difference of opinion with respect to 
KRZWKHSDWLHQW¶VLOOQHVVVKRXOGEHVWEHWUHDWHGWKH\PD\GLVDJUHHRver the correct diagnosis 
of the illness (is it glandular fever or merely a severe case of flu?) or about the most effective 
medication to prescribe (should it be steroids or antivirals?). Disagreements of these kinds 
occur within a view of the situation that is, for the most part, shared: within a shared form of 
                                                          
14
 I am not the first to have noticed the relevance of this passage to considerations of karma and reincarnation. 
See Purton (1992). 
15
 $VDVKRUWKDQGIRU³non-moral and non-spiritual´ we miJKWEHWHPSWHGWRXVHWKHWHUP³naturalistic´ But this 
would run up against the problem that I discussed earlier, which is that believers in karma may be operating 
with an expanded conception of the natural, according to which morality and spirituality are themselves 
dimensions of nature. 
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life. But the difference between one who thinks of illness as a punishment and one who has 
no such thoughts is of a different order. The disagreement over diagnosis and medication 
could, at least in principle, be resolved by carrying out further tests on the patient and by 
appealing to past experience of which treatments have been most effective.16 But how could a 
disagreement over whether illness is a punishment be resolved? How this question is to be 
answered would depend on many details about the particular case, but, as a general point, it is 
far from clear how it could be resolved by appealing to evidence that both parties already 
agree to constitute evidence of a relevant type. The kind of disagreement at issue is²or is at 
least something like²a difference of moral and religious outlook. None of this entails that a 
disagreement in form of life, or the particular type of such a disagreement to which I have 
just been referring, is necessarily irresolvable. But it should make us wary of presuming that 
it can be resolved without a significant change in worldview on the part of at least one of the 
parties in the dispute. 
2QHLPSOLFDWLRQRIWKHVHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLVWKDWZHVKRXOGQ¶WH[SHFWWKHGHEDWHRYHr 
whether a belief in retributive karma constitutes a morally unacceptable form of blaming the 
victim to be resolvable by appeal to commonly agreed criteria of evidence or argument. 
There will not be any knock-down argument to persuade one side that the other is right, for 
the starting assumptions are too disparate. For one party, it just is the case that suffering, 
misfortune, and various types of disadvantage are consequences of sins committed in 
previous lives. This belief is not based on evidence: it is a basic assumption in the light of 
which suffering, misfortune, and disadvantage are understood. For the other party, suffering, 
                                                          
16
 7KHSKUDVH³at least in principle´ is important here, and may be even more pertinent to other disagreements in 
opinions. For example, two art critics may hold contradictory opinions on the artistic value of a given work, and 
may in practice never reach agreement; but there is no reason why, in principle, they could not. For the 
disagreement occurs within a cultural context, a form of life, in which there is agreement that there are such 
things as works of art which have artistic value, and so on. The situation would be very different if someone 
from a culture which has no concept of art were to try to join the conversation. The disagreement over the 
artistic merit of a particular work could not even get off the ground. (We need not assume here that the 
distinction between disagreement in opinions and disagreement in form of life is always sharp, but there is, 
nonetheless, a significant distinction to be made.) 
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misfortune, and disadvantage are simply not understood in the same way: different things are 
thought and said, different pictures are applied.  
 
An alternative conception of rebirth 
A risk associated with my discussion up to this point is that the dichotomy between those 
ZKREHOLHYHLQNDUPDDQGUHLQFDUQDWLRQDQGWKRVHZKRGRQ¶WZLOODSSHDUYHU\VWDUNZLWKOLWWOH
room for compromise between them. In this final section, however, I want briefly to register 
the complexity of the conceptual possibilities by acknowledging a form of belief in 
reincarnation that involves perceiving apparent disadvantage in a way different from that 
which has been considered thus far²a way that departs significantly from the perspective 
that has been accused of blaming the victim. My purpose is not to advocate any particular 
form of reincarnation belief, but merely to hint at the variety of forms that such beliefs can 
take. 
7KHDOWHUQDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHWKDW,ZDQWWRKLJKOLJKWLVLOOXVWUDWHGE\DIROORZHURI5LVVKǀ
.ǀVHL.DLDFRQWHPSRUDU\-DSDQHVH%XGGKLVWPRYHPHQW17 In an interview with 
anthropologist Robert Kisala, this informant reflects in the following terms upon the question 
why his daughter was born with an intellectual impairment: 
 
They say that it is because of karma from previous existences, but there is someone 
involved in care for the mentally handicapped who wrote a book, and he says that it is 
precisely mentally handicapped children who represent what is best in the human 
race. Not to gloss over all the problems they face, but it is the mentally handicapped 
who are really gentle, genuine, and innocent. As other children grow older they gain 
in wisdom and knowledge, but they also become capable of doing wrong. When I 
                                                          
17
 For general information on this movement, see Clarke (1999, pp. 211±218). 
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realized this for the first time, rather than thinking about the cause of her handicap, I 
thought that instead I have much to learn from her genuineness and purity. (Quoted in 
Kisala 1994, p. 88) 
 
Here we see articulated a way of regarding intellectual impairment as a kind of blessing 
rather than a curse: as a condition that is not²or is not straightforwardly or exclusively²
detrimental to the life of the person with the impairment or to the lives of those who care 
for her. It is clear from other things that this man says to Kisala that he still believes in 
reincarnation,18 \HWKLVWXUQLQJDZD\IURPWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKDWFDXVHGKLVGDXJKWHU¶V
impairment differs from the way in which Arvind Sharma recommends that Hindus 
should turn away from this question. For Sharma, the question is not to be asked because 
WKHPRUHSUHVVLQJTXHVWLRQLV³*LYHQWKHVLWXDWLRQZKDWLVP\GXW\"´7KLVVKLIWWR
considerations of duty leaves untouched the perception of the person with whom one is 
faced as a wrongdoer who must have done something to deserve her current predicament. 
:KDWWKHDOWHUQDWLYHYLHZSRLQWYRLFHGE\.LVDOD¶VLQIRUPDQWIDFLOLWDWHVLVDWUDQVILJXUHG
perception of the person herself: perceiving her not as a pitiable wretch towards whom it 
LVRQH¶VGXW\WRGLVSOD\³ZDUP-KHDUWHGFRQFHUQWRPLQLPL]HWKHSHUVRQ¶VSUREOHPV´ 
(Sharma 1999), but as someone with whom one can have a deeply fulfilling relationship, 
and from whom there is much to be learnt, morally and spiritually. 
Of course, this direction of thinking harbours dangers of over-sentimentalization²of 
failing to see the disabled person as a whole and complex human being due to a veil of 
innocence and purity that one has cast over her. At the same time, however, the chance is 
afforded of relating to the person as a source of joy and inspiration, whose characteristics 
are not viewed as punishments designed to close down certain possibilities of living in 
                                                          
18
 For instance, he refers approvingly to the teaching of the /RWXV6ǌWUDDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK³you choose the 
place where you are to be born, ... where you might best be able to fulfil your own role´TXRWHGLQ.LVDOD
p. 88).  
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order to burn off the demerit incurred by former sins; rather, they are viewed as positive 
qualities that open up opportunities of loving relationship within a community of mutual 
FRQFHUQ.LVDOD¶VLQIRUPDQWLVVWUXJJOLQJWRZDUGVDUHOLQTXLVKPHQWRIWKHWKRXJKWWKDWKH
LVFDULQJIRUKLVGDXJKWHU³HYHQWKRXJK´VKHLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUKHURZQFRQGLWLRQDQGWKH
adoption of a transformed perception of the condition itself; he responds to her as the 
person she is, and not as someone who could have been something more, something less 
³GHIHFWLYH´LIRQO\ she had not been so sinful in a previous life. The association of bodily 
or mental impairment with retributive desert is being broken, and the wondrous mystery 
RIKLVGDXJKWHU¶VFRQGLWLRQUHOLHYHGRIWKHWDLQWRIVKDPHDQGJXLOW 
 
Conclusion 
Sometimes, when viewpoints come into conflict with one another, what is at issue is a 
disagreement in opinions: basic presuppositions are shared, and what needs to be resolved 
is the right interpretation of certain facts or the right inferences to be drawn on the basis 
of those facts. In other instances, however, what is at issue is something deeper, which 
can be characterized as a disagreement in forms of life: basic presuppositions are not 
VKDUHGWKHYHU\IUDPHZRUNRIRQHSHUVRQ¶VWKLQNLQJLVRXWRIMRLQWZLWKWKDWRf someone 
else. What I have argued in this paper is that the dispute between those who perceive the 
doctrine of karma as involving a morally abhorrent form of blaming the victim, and those 
who reject this charge, is best understood as a disagreement in forms of life. While the 
defenders of the doctrine think of illness, disability and other types of disadvantage in 
WHUPVRIUHWULEXWLRQFULWLFVRIWKHGRFWULQHGRQ¶WWKLQNRIUHWULEXWLRQDWDOO7KH\³WKLQN
GLIIHUHQWO\LQDGLIIHUHQWZD\´ 
Recognizing its depth does not make the dispute easier to resolve, but it affords us a 
fuller appreciation of why it continues to be so intractable. Resolution, I have proposed, 
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would take a form more like religious conversion than like the acceptance of the 
conclusion of an argument as true or of a fresh piece of evidence as clinching. This is not 
to say that participation in argument and the accumulation of evidence cannot play their 
part in precipitating such a conversion, but it is to suggest that such factors are unlikely to 
EHGHFLVLYHLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIPRUHJHQHUDOVKLIWVLQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VZRUOGYLHZZKLFK
shifts are apt to be tied to broader cultural changes. The growing prestige of naturalistic 
and scientific ways of thinking within a culture, for example, typifies the factors that tend 
to militate against continued belief in retributive karma.19 
Finally, in order to avoid giving the impression that perspectives on karma and 
reincarnation are reducible to a polar opposition between those who accept the doctrine in 
its retributive mode and those who reject it altogether, some reflections have been offered 
on what strikes me as a highly nuanced conception of reincarnation²one which brings 
out the positive potential of DSHUVRQ¶Vcharacteristics that might, in another light, be 
viewed as deficiencies. Such a transfigured perception of the reincarnated person 
radically subverts many traditional construals of the link between disadvantage and past-
life immorality in ways that have hardly begun to be touched on in this article. It goes 
without saying, therefore, that there remains much scope for further philosophical 
exploration of these and other complex implications of the variety of beliefs in karma and 
reincarnation.20 
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